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Supply chain management involves the selection, coordination and motivation of independently 
operated suppliers. However the central planner's perspective in operations management translates 
poorly to vertically separated chains, where suppliers may have rational myopic reasons to object 
to full in- formation sharing and centralized decision rights. Particular problems occur when a 
downstream coordinator demands relation-specific investments (equipment, cost improvements in 
processes, adaptation of components to downstream processes, allocation of future capacity etc) 
from upstream suppliers without being able to commit to long-term contracts. In practice and 
theory, this leads of- ten to a phenomenon of either underinvestment in the chain or costly vertical 
integration to solve the commitment problem. A two-stage supply chain under stochastic demand 
and  information  asymmetry  is  modelled.  A  repeated  investment-production  game  with 
coordinator commitment in supplier's investment addresses the information sharing and asset-
specific investment problem. We provide a mitigation of the hold-up problem on the investment 
cost observed by the supplier and an instrument for truthful revelation of private information by 
using an investment sharing device. We show that there is an interior solution for the investment 
sharing parameter and discuss some extensions to the work. 
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As the product life cycle is decreasing under shrinking or constant margins,
an urgent problem for industrial supply chains is how to assure upstream
product development, process improvements and capacity provision with
incomplete or short-term contracts. Second or third-tier suppliers face con-
siderable risk in undertaking relation-speci￿c investments in a more volatile
business climate, where the return on investment not only is a question of in-
formation dissemination but also a result of a risk allocation between supply
chain partners.
As seen in theory as well as in practice, the properties of this alloca-
tion mechanism exposed to the inevitable agency problems in decentralized
decision making in￿ uence heavily the viability and the pro￿tability of the
organization. The hold-up problem, i.e. the non-reimbursement of a spe-
ci￿c sunk investment by a buyer, is not only an artifact of opportunistic
behavior that could be ignored in a ￿ trusting￿climate. The supplier may
serve multiple clients, the investment may be undertaken before the down-
stream product is de￿ned or a large part of the investment may be unver-
i￿able opportunity costs from internal resource time or through declined
orders. Simplistic solutions using out-of-equilibrium results are moreover
sensitive to any exogenous shocks in ownership, ￿nancial structure or reg-
ulation, potentially changing tacit agreements in an unfavorable direction.
The problem studied is truly related to supply chain management along its
de￿nition as an inter-￿rm coordination activity, more than to the intra￿rm
centralized perspective of operations management. The relevance is highest
in industries with far going decentralization (vertical separation) and short
product life cycles, such as the high-technology telecommunications indus-
try, electronics or toys. However, the results can also be extended to service
industries in cooperation with information industries, such as fast-food or
software industry interacting with media producers (cf. Kultti and Takalo,
2002).
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1The objective of the paper is to study the possibility of using invest-
ment sharing as a commitment and coordination device under asymmetric
information and contractual incompleteness with risk of double moral haz-
ard i.e. from buyer·s and seller·s side simultaneously. The idea, already
evoked in Agrell, Lindroth and Norrman (2004), to use direct participation
in upstream investments to gain information and to signal commitment, has
both theoretical and practical relevance. As an anecdotical example con-
sider the onsite supplier contracts at the MCC Smart plant in Hambach.
The suppliers, that provide 85% of the process value added, are in terms
of information and physically integrated in the process with considerable
relation-speci￿c investments as a consequence. As the coordinating party
MCC is mainly engaged in downstream activities related to communication
and sales, the relationship could easily degenerate to a rent-sharing battle
given the asymmetric information on capacity and costs. On the one hand,
the suppliers are paid only at sell-through of the vehicles, which allocates
all inventory risk to them in spite of not controlling the downstream chan-
nel. This risk, in combination with the overall business risk attached to an
innovative product and a new business model, would potentially limit the
willingness of the suppliers to undertake relation-speci￿c investments. An
alternative could have been to use existing facilities to serve the demand
during the introduction phase, thereby limiting the investment risk. On the
other hand, the supplier integration and joint product development process
is an integral part of the MCC Smart business model. The viability of the
project prohibits the use of long contracts to allocate all risk to the coordi-
nator, having too limited capital leverage to carry. It also requires levers to
safeguard the highly leveraged coordinator against collective or individual
attempts to acquire rents in the chain by using bargaining power. The im-
plemented solution to these moral hazard problems, the investment hold-up
by MCC and the rent hold-up by the suppliers, is found in an investment
sharing mechanism where MCC amortizes the relation-speci￿c investments
through a leasing contract over ten years. In our notation where the cap-
ital opportunity cost is likely to be di⁄erent from the ￿scal depreciation
rate, we can express this as an investment sharing with an interior solution.
The sharing provides some guarantees against hold-up by MCC, as well as
information about the cost structure to MCC.
The paper makes reference to two streams of literature, the industrial
organization stream on joint investments in supply chains and the agency
work and game theoretical work on hold-up problems.
Hennart (1991) provides empirical support to the transaction cost ap-
proach to joint ventures as commitment devices, using the example of Japanese
2investments in the United States. Park and Russo (1996) give a compre-
hensive overview of the con￿ icting commitment and incentive problems in
joint ventures, showing empirical evidence of failures at inadequate levels
of investment sharing. Too high participation shifts risks to downstream
and potentially distorts incentives for process and cost e¢ ciency upstream,
creating lock-in situations that may be suboptimal. Too low or no sharing
of the investment may signal a lack of commitment and open for specula-
tion about the credibility of the non-contractual engagement to reimburse
the full cost, consequently lowering the incentives for speci￿c investments
by agency problems. In our model we explicitly address these ￿ndings by
making the direct sharing costly already at the investment stage through
information access and by modelling the anticipated hold-up risk as endoge-
nously determining the investment and production game.
The literature on hold-up and commitment signals dates before Williamson
(1983), although its formal treatment has pro￿ted from the information eco-
nomics and the agency theoretical breakthroughs in the 1980ies. In the
normative economics literature the hold-up problem has long been acknowl-
edged as an important and challenging instance of contractual design failure
under agency problems. Grout (1984) showed that incomplete contracts
lead to welfare losses in investment problems, framing the problem in a
renegotiation scenario. In the agency literature, Tirole (1986) addressed the
investment problem under asymmetric information, showing that ex post
settlements provide incentives to maintain information to lower the hold-
up risk. Rogerson (1992) proved a series of contractual solutions to the
general hold-up problem under commitment and various information struc-
tures. Several interesting works have continued the incomplete contracts to
￿nd solutions for speci￿c structures. Smirnov and Wait (2001) consider the
problem of sequential investments in a horizontal relationship as a second
best solution to the hold-up problem. As the successive investments are
only possible after the project has been undertaken, the hold-up for the fol-
lower is reduced. However authors show that the timing decision in itself
can provide a hold-up problem that lowers the supply chain surplus. Gul
(2001) shows that the asymmetric information in itself, i.e. the unobservable
investment, can be used to leverage the hold-up problem by implementing
certain disclosure policies. However, in this work the investment is made by
the buyer in anticipation of a sequence of bids from the seller. On the same
lines, Gonzales (1999) argues for the private information as a rent guarantee
for the investor, protecting against hold-up and hence providing incentives
for investments in the interest of the chain. Although the setting in Gon-
zales (1999) is one of screening where the agent moves ￿rst, the ￿ndings
3are consistent with those of the current paper. The screening framework is
further extended in Gonzales (2001) for the case where the agent￿ s type is
gradually revealed in a dynamic game and renegotiation is possible.
Our setting is similar to that of Pitchford and Snyder (2004) where the
authors show that the classic hold-up problem can be solved by moving from
a static to a dynamic framework. The agent invests in small increments that
are observable by the principal who reimburses the increments ex post to
continue the game. Rather than modelling an in￿nite horizon of periods of
equal length with discounting, as in this paper, Pitchford and Snyder (2004)
use a single period subdivided in an in￿nite number of subperiods and a
probability of exit.
Agrell et al. (2004) show for a three-stage chain with exogenously given
coordination instruments that information revelation about investment is
not a Nash-equilibrium of the investment-production game in a one-shot
two-period setting under decentralized decision making and asymmetric in-
formation: S invests opportunistically and without disclosure, the chain un-
derperforms in terms of production quantities leading to coordination losses
in terms of joint surplus.
Whereas the latter concentrates on the outcomes of a two-period investment-
production game under di⁄erent coordination regimes, coordination by dif-
ferent members of the chain and asymmetric information, this work examines
the outcome of an in￿nitely repeated game under downstream coordination
and information asymmetry. However, the same double postcontractual
moral hazard is present: (i) the manufacturer does not reimburse the sup-
plier the speci￿c and sunk investment cost in the ￿rst period if information
is disclosed or observable. The hold-up increases the manufacturer￿ s short-
term rent but violates the supplier￿ s reservation utility ex post. The supplier
anticipates this hold-up and invests privately to extract a smaller, yet undis-
puted information rent. (ii) If the manufacturer subsidizes the investment
cost with a non-recoverable payment in the ￿rst period the supplier has an
incentive to exercise a hit-and-run, i.e. collecting the investment premium
without undertaking the investment and then refusing production in the sec-
ond period. This e⁄ect is due to the lack of veri￿ability of the investment.
As a consequence, the manufacturer refrains from reimbursing a too high
amount in the ￿rst period without veri￿ability, even if this entails a cost for
the chain.
The contributions to the positive supply chain literature come from the
explicit results for combined industrial settings (no commitment due to high
product risk, short product life, high speci￿c investments and no ￿nancial
possibilities to integrate vertically) that has been commonly observed and
4commented. We provide proofs to support joint investment practices to
signal commitment under asymmetric information. It also provides an ad-
ditional viewpoint on the rent sharing game in the supply chain, empirically
far from the extreme allocations found in stylized models. The paper also
contributes to the economics research on games with repeated, irreversible
investments under information asymmetry. Our results extend earlier sta-
tic results and complement dynamic results from other speci￿cations of the
investment and production game.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the stylized model,
the dynamic game and the action space, section 3 characterizes the Nash
equilibria in the game, section 4 derives some results for the outcomes, sec-
tion 5 presents a numerical illustration and some conclusions in section 6
close the paper.
2 The Model
The model represents a decentralized two-tier supply chain producing a sin-
gle product for sale on the ￿nal market. The supply chain consists of one
independent entity at each tier: an manufacturer M (she) and a supplier S
(he). The manufacturer M, downstream in the chain, develops the product
and serves the market demand for it. S provides components, assembles the
product on M￿ s order and delivers it to M. M is price taker, with a price
p, on a competitive market with stochastic, stationary demand D. The
downstream price p and the distribution of D are common knowledge. Nei-
ther S nor M have outside opportunities re￿ ecting the situation resulting
from relation-speci￿c investment which has only negligible value outside the
relationship. Production and sales of the product take place during two
periods for each product generation1. Thereafter a new product generation
is introduced since the industry is assumed to be highly innovative.
In the ￿rst period of each product generation S may undertake an in-
vestment leading to a decrease of marginal costs in the second period. The
investment cost A is drawn from a uniform distribution2 with support on
[Alow;Ahigh] such that Alow > 0. The type of distribution and the inter-
val [Alow;Ahigh] are common knowledge. Products or investments from the
previous generation have no value in the subsequent one3.
1The periods in the generations can be interpreted as an initial launch period, during
which capacity investments must be made to meet a second maturity period.
2The choice of distribution is without loss of generality and only to obtain tractable
analytical results.
3Value of equipment and ￿nal products from di⁄erent product generations, e.g. GSM
5S has private information about its cost function Ct (:), t = 1;2. The
investment decision cannot be observed4 by M, nor the actual investment
cost A: S￿ s ￿rst period cost function C1 (:) is de￿ned as:
C1 (Q1;￿) = cQ1 + ￿A (1)
where c > 0 is the unit cost of production, Q1 is the actual production
of the ￿rst period and ￿ 2 f0;1g a binary variable. ￿ = 1 indicates that
investment A is undertaken, ￿ = 0 else.





with ￿ being the indicator of previous period·s investment, Q2 the second
period￿ s production quantity and 0 < c0 < c the decrease of unit costs
through investment.
For each product generation S￿ s the two-period utility5 is
USg (:) = v1Q1 ￿ C1 (Q1;￿) + v2Q2 ￿ C2 (Q2;￿) (3)
Thereby vi, i = 1;2, denote the unit wholesale price M pays S for
production in the ￿rst and second period. S maximizes his horizon util-
ity which the in￿nite sum of all two-period utilities or generation utilities







Without loss of generality, ￿xed costs other than those of the speci￿c
investment are ignored at any stage, as the focus is on the pro￿t contribution
of a particular decision6. S￿ s reservation utility US is normalized to zero.
For each product generation M￿ s two-period utility is
UMg (:) = (p ￿ v1)Q1 + (p ￿ v2)Q2 (5)
standards or con￿gurations are often without value in subsequent production.
4Investments may concern allocation or training of internal sta⁄, dedication of
processes, declined orders to safeguard capacity or cost-increasing operating choices to
e.g. adapt to the partner￿ s routines.
5We ignore within-period discounting, assuming either that prices and costs are given
in real terms, or alternatively, that the duration of each generation is fairly short.
6Fixed costs may intervene in the in￿nite game only as participation constraints.
6Thereby we assume that p > vi ￿ c. She maximizes her horizon utility







M￿ s reservation utility UM is normalized to zero.
M sequentially decides upon the order quantities for the two periods of
each product generation, Q1 and Q2. Since the focus of the model lies on
strategic interactions concerning investment we refrain from introducing an
explicit decision rule for order quantities which may be e.g. newsboy-type
as in e.g. Agrell et al. (2004). For our model we simply assume that there
are two optimal order quantities, Q￿ and Q￿￿ with Q￿￿ > Q￿ > 0, which
can be sold on the market: Q￿ if no investment has been undertaken and
Q￿￿ in case of investment. Q￿ and Q￿￿ are common knowledge. From this
assumption follows that M will order Q￿￿ if she knows that investment has
been undertaken in the previous period and Q￿ else.
From C2 (:) = (c ￿ ￿c0)Q2 follows that c0Q2 are cost savings from in-
vestment. If c0Q2 ￿ Ahigh every investment opportunity would be pro￿table
and the solution trivial. Therefore we introduce the assumption of a non-
trivial investment policy c0Q￿￿ < Ahigh. Denote e A￿ = c0Q￿ as the highest
acceptable investment cost under the quantity Q￿ and e A￿￿ = c0Q￿￿ under
the quantity Q￿￿, respectively with e A￿￿ > e A￿. The two limits are used for
the investment decision A ￿ e A￿or A ￿ e A￿￿.
Both S and M are assumed to be riskneutral, rational and opportunis-
tic. The coordination of the supply chain is exercised to M by sequentially
proposing S single-period contract as a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er7. In case of
weak indi⁄erence, the coordinating option is supposed to prevail.
In order to overcome the double deadlock, the threats of hold-up and
hit-and-run, commitment to future cooperation has to be signalled with
other means than long contracts. Investment sharing is one of the coordina-
tor￿ s possible instrument to reassure the upstream chain against downstream
hold-ups, whereas (costly external) investment cost veri￿ability protects the
downstream coordinator against upstream hit-and-run strategies.
7This corresponds to the practice among Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)
developing, marketing and distributing products and services to be manufactured by Con-
tract Manufacturers (CM).
72.1 Investment sharing and investment cost veri￿ability
In order to model M￿ s direct commitment in S￿ s relation-speci￿c investment
a sharing parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] is introduced. Here investment sharing means
that M contributes the fraction ￿ of S·s investment cost in the ￿rst and
reimburses the remaining (1￿￿) in the second period. ￿ = 0 means that M
bears no investment costs at all in the ￿rst period, whereas ￿ = 1 that M
completely reimburses the investment costs in the ￿rst period.
Due to the lack of veri￿ability of investment M is exposed to the threat
of hit-and-run. In order to implement investment sharing M requires an
audit or review, revealing information about whether the investment was
undertaken and an estimate of its necessary cost.
The veri￿able investment cost function A(￿) has the following properties:
(i) A(￿) > 0 8￿ (positive investment),
(ii)
dA(￿)
d￿ ￿ 0 8￿ 2 [0;1] and 9￿ with
dA(￿)
d￿ > 0 (non-decreasing marginal
investment distortion)
(iii) A(0) = A, with A being the initial investment possibility observed
by S.
A possible interpretation of the investment cost distortion is that M
assigns a costly third-party to verify whether investment was undertaken and
its true costs. Another interpretations of the investment distortion relate to
standard moral hazard in investment with lower incentives for the investor
to screen the investment opportunities, using more expensive external sta⁄
to perform work to obtain veri￿able information, selection of equipment
with higher quality (non-monetary bene￿ts) or kick-backs from the provider
to sta⁄ (monetary ￿ leaks￿ ), or simply the cost of the coordination of the
investment decision.
2.2 Order of Play
1. Nature chooses the initial investment opportunity A from [Alow;Ahigh].
S observes A.
2. M proposes a mechanism M1 (Q1;v1) to S. M may signal investment
sharing.
3. S accepts or rejects M1 (Q1;v1). If S rejects, go to 8.
4. S decides on disclosure of A. If S discloses, S and M settle on ￿ and
M transfers S ￿A(￿) for A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿. S invests if possible. S produces
Q1, demand D1 is revealed and payouts to all for period 1.
8Payo⁄s UMg (N) USg (N)
A > e A￿ ￿N > 0 0
A ￿ e A￿ ￿N > 0 ￿ ￿ 0
Table 1: Non-Cooperation Payo⁄s
5. M proposes a mechanism M2 (Q2;v2) to S. S accepts or rejects M2 (Q2;v2).
If S rejects go to step 8.
6. S produces Q2.
7. M decides on reimbursement of investment (or not). Demand is re-
vealed and payouts to all for period 2.
8. Steps 1 to 7 are repeated for each product generation.
2.3 Actions
Four actions (non-cooperation, joint investment, integrated investment and
hold-up) are introduced below for the single-generation subgame and M￿ s
and S￿ s payo⁄s for each action are derived. We assume that M pays a unit
wholesale price equal to S￿ s marginal costs of a quantity: v1 = v2 = c. In
case that S discloses information about investment v2 = (c ￿ c0).
2.3.1 Non-cooperation, [N]
In the case of non-cooperation [N], S￿ s action is not to disclose information
about investment costs and to invest secretly for A ￿ e A￿.
M cannot observe investment and orders Q1 = Q2 = Q￿, pay-o⁄ equals
UMg (:) = ￿N with ￿N = 2[(p ￿ c)Q￿] > 0.
S￿ s pay-o⁄ amounts to USg (:) = cQ￿ ￿ (cQ￿ + ￿A) + cQ￿ ￿ (c ￿ ￿c0)Q￿
which simpli￿es to ￿ = ￿(c0Q￿ ￿ A). For A ￿ e A￿ (￿ = 1) this information
rent is non-negative, ￿ ￿ 0. For A > e A￿ (￿ = 0) S·s payo⁄ is zero since no
investment takes place. The payo⁄s are resumed in Table 1
2.3.2 Joint investment, [J￿]
In the case of joint investment, S discloses information about investment
in return for a non-enforcable agreement about joint investment using the
sharing parameter ￿. As described earlier the sharing mechanism distorts
the initial investment cost, such that A(￿) ￿ A is the cost occurred.
9Payo⁄s UMg (J￿) USg (J￿)
A(￿) > e A￿￿ ￿N > 0 0
A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ ^ A > e A￿ ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(￿) > 0 0
A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ ^ A ￿ e A￿ ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(￿) ￿ ￿ > 0 ￿ ￿ 0
Table 2: Joint Investment Payo⁄s
For A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ M orders Q1 = Q￿ in the ￿rst and Q2 = Q￿￿ in the
second period.
It is immediately noticed that [J￿] can be a non-dominated strategy for
S only if he is compensated for his information rent from secret investment
under non-cooperation, ￿ (there must be reward for exposure to hold-up).
Thus, for A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ and A ￿ e A￿ M pays A(￿) for the investment
and ￿ for investment disclosure. M earns (p ￿ c)Q￿ + (p ￿ (c ￿ c0))Q￿￿
from production. This can be transformed to ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ with ￿C =
(p ￿ c)(Q￿￿ ￿ Q￿) > 0 and c0Q￿￿ > 0. Hence M￿ s pay-o⁄ is UMg (J￿) =
￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(￿) ￿ ￿ > 0 and S￿ s USg (J￿) = ￿ ￿ 0.
In the case that A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ and A > e A￿ S￿ s pay-o⁄ becomes zero and
UMg (J￿) = ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(￿) > 0.
For A(￿) > e A￿￿ the production quantities are Q1 = Q2 = Q￿ and both
players￿payo⁄s in Table 2remain the same as under non-cooperation.
We abstract from the ￿ extreme distortion￿ on investment cost where
c0Q￿￿ < A(￿) + ￿. This could happen if A < e A￿ but the resulting A(￿) =
e A￿￿, thus yielding positive information rent ￿ = (c0Q￿ ￿ A) > 0 but an
unpro￿table investment c0Q￿￿￿ e A￿￿￿￿ < 0 since by de￿nition c0Q￿￿ = e A￿￿.
This would yield the ￿ perverse￿outcome, in that a relatively cheap initial
investment A which can be secretly internalized by S alone under the lower
production quantity Q￿ cannot be internalized by the chain under Q￿￿ > Q￿.
2.3.3 Integrated investment, [J1]
Integrated investment is a special case of joint investment in that the sharing
parameter is ￿ = 1. As under J￿, M pays ￿ for information disclosure
and S discloses information about investment cost A. The investment is
then internalized by M and S carries no risk at all. Production quantities
are Q1 = Q2 = Q￿ without investment or Q1 = Q￿ and Q2 = Q￿￿ with
investment. Also in this case we disregard extreme investment distortion
with c0Q￿￿ < A(1) + ￿. Payo⁄s to both players are summarized in Table 3
below.
10Payo⁄s UMg (J1) USg (J1)
A(1) > e A￿￿ ￿N > 0 0
A(1) ￿ e A￿￿ ^ A > e A￿ ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(1) > 0 0
A(1) ￿ e A￿￿ ^ A ￿ e A￿ ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(1) ￿ ￿ > 0 ￿ ￿ 0
Table 3: Full Investment Payo⁄s
Payo⁄s UMg (H) USg (H)
A(￿) > e A￿￿ ￿N > 0 0
A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ ^ A > e A￿ ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(￿) + ￿H > 0 ￿￿H
A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ ^ A ￿ e A￿ ￿N + ￿C + c0Q￿￿ ￿ A(￿) + ￿H ￿ ￿ > 0 ￿ ￿ ￿H
Table 4: Hold-up Payo⁄s
2.3.4 Hold-up, [H]
Hold-up corresponds to the case where M holds up S. The action is applica-
ble only if S plays [J￿] for ￿ < 1 and entails renegging the second-period
reimbursement ￿H = (1 ￿ ￿)A(￿) > 0. The payo⁄s are given Table 4
As for the joint investment strategy [J￿], full investment integration [J1]
requires an attribution of a positive rent ￿ for A < e A￿ to S. Note, that
for the chain as a whole, playing [N] is suboptimal since [J￿] and [J1] yield
higher sales and may therefore result in higher pro￿ts.
3 Equilibrium
Now we derive an equilibrium of an in￿nitely repeated investment-production
game consisting of two-period generations.
Obviously, for both players no production yielding utilities UM = US = 0
is weakly dominated by [N], [J1] and [J￿] yielding payo⁄s equal to or higher
than zero. Under [H] M collects the highest possible one-generation payo⁄,
S·s payo⁄ may be negative. Since hold-up occurs after S has carried out
second-period production it cannot change S·s decision about second-period
production. Hit-and-run by S fails on veri￿ability. Thus attention can now
be limited to outcomes with production in both periods.
Proposition 1 In a one-generation subgame, for M :
1) [H] dominates [J￿], [J1] and [N].
2) [J￿] dominates [J1] and [N].
3) [J1] dominates [N].
11Proof. From the payo⁄s follows:
For A(￿) > e A￿￿: Since A(￿) > e A￿￿ and
￿A(￿)
￿￿ ￿ 0 so A1 ￿ e A￿￿ and
UMg (H) = UMg (J￿) = UMg (J1) = UMg (N) = ￿N.
For A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿:
1) Since ￿H > 0 so UMg (H)￿UMg (J￿) = ￿H > 0 and since A(￿) ￿ A(1)
so UMg (H) ￿ UMg (J1) ￿ ￿H. UMg (H) ￿ UMg (N) > ￿H.
2) UMg (J￿)￿UMg (J1) ￿ 0 since A(￿) ￿ A(1). UMg (J￿)￿UMg (N) ￿ 0.
3) UMg (J1) ￿ UMg (N) ￿ 0.
Proposition 2 In a one-generation subgame,
1) S is indi⁄erent between [N], [J1] and [J￿].
2) For S [N], [J1] and [J￿] strictly dominate [H] for A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿.
Proof. From the payo⁄s follows:
1) For A ￿ e A￿: USg (N) = USg (J1) = USg (J￿) = ￿ ￿ 0.
For A > e A￿: USg (N) = USg (J1) = USg (J￿) = 0.
2) For A ￿ e A￿: USg (H) = ￿￿￿H < ￿ = USg (N) = USg (J1) = USg (J￿).
For e A￿ ￿ A ￿ e A￿￿: USg (H) = ￿￿H < 0 = USg (N) = USg (J1) =
USg (J￿).
So far we have looked at payo⁄s for one-generation subgames. In the
repeated game, actions are taken repeatedly and there is a payo⁄ for each
player in every product generation. The payo⁄ of the in￿nitely repeated
game is thus the sum of the payo⁄ in ￿rst generation g = 0 and the dis-
counted expected payo⁄s for all subsequent generations g > 0. As men-
tioned before there is asymmetric information for g = 0: at contracting
time S knows the precise values, M does not. M and S share symmetric
information about expected values for g > 0. We introduce the sequence
notation [G0;G] where G0 stands for the action played in the ￿rst-generation
subgame and G for the action played in all subsequent ones.
Future payo⁄s are discounted with the factor (1 + r)￿t with the con-
stant r > 0 being M￿ s weighted average generation capital cost and t the
generation index, converging to ￿ = 1
1￿(1+r)￿1 for ￿1





Proposition 3 1) There is no pardon in a non-dominated strategy, i.e.
investment sharing [J￿] is not played after a hold-up [H] has been executed
once.
2) Full investment integration [J1] is the only outcome of a non-dominated
strategy after a hold-up.
12Proof. 1) Suppose S chooses to pardon M and to play [J￿] after [H]. S￿ s
acceptance of [J￿] after [H] would mean that there is no punishment for
exercising a hold-up. For M [J￿] is strictly dominated by [H] if A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿,
the expected payo⁄for M is identical to the one in the previous period, when
[H] was played. Thus, M plays [H] after [H]. A deviation for S playing [N]
or [J￿] dominates pardon, since for A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ [H] is strictly dominated for
him. Therefore [J￿] is a dominated strategy after [H].
2) Because of the non-pardon strategy M cannot play [J￿] after [H].
Hence, after exercising [H] M￿ s only options are [J1] and [N]. Since [J1]
dominates [N] for her, M plays [J1]. As already shown S is indi⁄erent
between [N] and [J1] and does not deviate so any series alternating [N] and
[J1] after [H] fails to satisfy M￿ s e¢ ciency condition.
To implement the no-pardon strategy, S may use a trigger strategy in
which the ￿rm initiates cooperates and continue cooperating until one ￿rm
reneges, in which case the ￿rm refuse to cooperate forever after (cf. Plam-
beck et al. 2007). In our model this means that S starts by accepting [J￿]
and continues playing [J￿] until M exercises [H], in which case [J￿] is never
possible again. Proposition 3 shows that communication pre-play commu-
nication concerning the trigger strategy is credible.
Proposition 3 also shows that the best M can do after [H] is play-
ing [J1] forever, i.e. [H;J1]. There is a trade-o⁄ for M in long-term be-
tween the immediate gain ￿H and the sum of forgone expected future
gains  fE[UMg (J￿)]￿E[UMg (J1)]g. Therefore the in￿nitely-repeated game
is not path-independent: Reputation is decisive for the equilibrium of this
game.
As already shown, in a one-generation subgame for M, investment shar-
ing [J￿] dominates full investment integration [J1] and non-cooperation [N].
Repetition does not change the conclusion. Without a proceeding [H] S
does not deviate since he is indi⁄erent between [J￿], [J1] and [N]. Also any
series alternating [J￿], [N] and [J1] in the repeated game without [H] fails
to satisfy M￿ s e¢ ciency condition and can be excluded from consideration.
Proposition 4 In an in￿nitely repeated investment-production game under
asymmetric information on investment, joint investment in all product gen-
erations [J￿;J￿] is a Nash equilibrium under the following mechanism.
(i) One-period price-quantity contracts
M1 (Q￿;c) in the ￿rst period of a generation and
M2 (Q￿￿;c ￿ c0) under the sharing parameter ￿￿ < 1 such that [J￿￿;J￿￿] %
[H;J1] for A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿ or
M2 (Q￿;c) for A(￿) > e A￿￿ in the ￿rst period of a generation,
13(ii) Complete reimbursement of distorted investment cost A(￿￿) spread
over two periods,
(iii) Incomplete rent extraction by M,
(iv) Non-negative information rent, ￿ = max(c0Q￿ ￿ A;0), for S.
Proof. First, assume that [J￿￿;J￿￿] is a Nash equilibrium for S.
(i) M￿ s participation constraint is ful￿lled since UMg(J￿￿) > UM for
A(￿) > e A￿￿ and UMg(J￿￿) > UM for A(￿) ￿ e A￿￿.
(ii) M·s e¢ ciency condition is ful￿lled. M does not deviate ordering
Q1 6= Q￿ or Q2 6= Q￿ for A(￿) > e A￿￿ and Q2 6= Q￿￿ since Q￿ and Q￿￿
are optimal quantities for her decision. Analogically, deviating to v1 6= c or
v2 6= c for A(￿) > e A￿￿ and v2 6= (c ￿ c0) for A(￿) > e A￿￿ would only either
result in overpaying S for production or underpaying him (in which case S
would reject participation) without any additional value for M. Neither does
M deviate o⁄ering ￿1 < ￿￿ since ￿1 exposes S to the hold up risk. S would
anticipate hold-up and deviate to [J1]; which is dominated, without M being
able to harvest ￿H. ￿2 > ￿￿ may only increase investment costs because of
the non-negative distortion resulting in UMg(J￿2) ￿ UMg(J￿￿).
Because of (i) and (ii) [J￿￿;J￿￿] is a Nash equilibrium for M.
Now, assume that [J￿￿;J￿￿] is a Nash equilibrium for M.
(i) S￿ s participation constraint is ful￿lled since USg(J￿￿) = 0 = US for
A > e A￿ and USg(J￿￿) = ￿ ￿ US for A ￿ e A￿.
(ii) S·s e¢ ciency condition is ful￿lled. Without [H] being played earlier
S is indi⁄erent between [J￿￿], [J1] and [N] so he has no incentive to deviate.
Hit-and-run is outruled by veri￿ability.
Because of (i) and (ii) [J￿￿;J￿￿] is a weak Nash equilibrium for S.
This proposition shows that in a decentralized supply chain joint invest-
ment is possible and stable, since it is an equilibrium under M1(:), M2(:) and
￿￿. The proposition also shows that, for A < e A￿, M is not able to extract all
chain rent. This result is conform with La⁄ont et al. (1993) identifying the
trade-o⁄between incentives and rent extraction, i.e. the higher the incentive
scheme of a contract, the lower the rent extraction and vice versa.
The modelled investment-production game with investment cost shar-
ing is not restricted to cost-reducing investments. Its results can also be
applied to capacity increasing investments because of the common charac-
teristics of cost-reducing and capacity increasing investments: funds have
to be sunk, investments increase the (value of) output and investments are
risky. Therefore, going back to the objective of this work, this joint invest-
ment equilibrium means that the capacity problem can be mitigated through
M·s direct commitment in S￿ s investment.
144 Benchmark of results
To investigate whether the investment sharing mechanism provides any value
to the chain we will compare its outcome to the centralized case, to an
in￿nitely repeated investment-production game without investment sharing
and to a mixed-strategy game.
4.1 Centralized case
The centralized benchmark corresponds to a vertically integrated chain with
a central coordinator maker maximizing chain surplus under full informa-




g=0 USCg (:) with USCg (:) = (p ￿ c)Q1 + (p ￿ c + ￿c0)Q2 ￿ ￿Ag. The op-
timal investment decision is governed by max(c0Q￿￿ ￿ Ag;0) with ￿ = 1 if
c0Q￿￿ ￿ Ag and ￿ = 0 else. Again the optimal quantities are Q1 = Q￿,
Q2 = Q￿￿ if ￿ = 1 and Q2 = Q￿ else.






Alow f(p ￿ c)(Q￿￿ ￿ Q￿) + c0Q￿￿ ￿ agf (a)da
)
(7)
4.2 In￿nitely repeated investment-production game with in-
vestment sharing






A￿ f(p ￿ c)(Q￿￿ ￿ Q￿) + c0Q￿￿ ￿ agf (a)da
)
(8)
with A￿ being the lowest value of the veri￿able investment function.
Under the sharing mechanism the supply chain does not reach ￿rst-best
since some pro￿table investments A ￿ e A￿￿are rationed. The coordination
loss under the sharing mechanism amounts to:









The loss is non-negative since the value of the integral is non-negative
for A￿ = Alow and positive for A￿ > Alow.




fc0Q￿ ￿ agf (a)da (10)
M·s ex ante expected utility from [J￿￿;J￿￿] amounts to:
E[UM(:)] = ￿
8
> > > > > <




A￿ (p ￿ c)(Q￿￿ ￿ Q￿)f (a)da
+
R e A￿￿
A￿ fc0Q￿￿ ￿ agf (a)da
￿
R e A￿
Alowfc0Q￿ ￿ agf (a)da
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
(11)
4.3 In￿nitely repeated investment-production game without
investment sharing
Without investment sharing, M has to internalize the full investment cost A
either in the ￿rst period or in the second if she wants it to be disclosed. There
is no investment cost distortion through auditing, which is M·s instrument
to prevent hit-and-run. As before M cannot observe investment, however S
may provide a non-veri￿able signal of investment.
Suppose M were to reimburse investment costs to S in the ￿rst period
in exchange for a non-veri￿able signal of investment. Because of the lack of
veri￿ability S has an incentive to in￿ ate as much as possible the signalling
value V such that it is the highest acceptable cost for M V ￿ e A￿￿. In the
case that
V >  [
R e A￿￿
Alow(V ￿ a)f(a)da ￿
R e A￿
Alow(c0Q￿ ￿ a)f(a)da]
S will exercise a hit-and-run since the immediate utility he realizes dom-
inates his expected future utility from disclosed investment. Since M·s one-
generation payo⁄ from hit-and-run is (p ￿ c)Q￿ ￿ V and thus lower than
from non-cooperation 2(p￿c)Q￿, M would not transfer V in the ￿rst period
under the mentioned condition.
Suppose S accepts a reimbursement in the second period. M holds him
up if
V >  [
R e A￿￿
Alow f(p ￿ c)(Q￿￿ ￿ Q￿) + c0Q￿￿ ￿ V gf (a)da],
i.e. the value of the signal is higher than her expected future gain from
cooperation. S anticipates the hold-up and signals the highest V which
prevents hold-up or invests secretly.
16The supply chain may therefore implement the ￿rst-best solution if there
is a V ￿￿ with Alow ￿ V ￿￿ ￿ e A￿￿ such that either M has no incentive to hold-
up and/or S has no incentive to hit-and-run. Whether or not the chain can
implement investment under this regime depends on the underlying parame-
ters. In particular decreasing margins (p￿(c￿c0)) favour the implementation
of the investment sharing mechanism since they lower the private bene￿ts
from investment.
In such a case S￿ s and M￿ s ex ante rents would be as follows:
E[UW
S (:)] = ￿
Z e A￿￿
Alow
fV ￿￿ ￿ agf (a)da (12)
E[UW







Alow(p ￿ c)(Q￿￿ ￿ Q￿)f (a)da
+
R e A￿￿





However, there is again a trade-o⁄ between chain e¢ ciency and rent
extraction. In an investment game without the sharing device M would
potentially overpay investment. Hence it may be rational for M to tradeo⁄
the overall e¢ ciency against rent appropration for herself.
In the case that V ￿￿ does not exist non-cooperation in all generations is
the only equilibrium of the game without a sharing device. There, the use
of the sharing mechanism generates a higher surplus for the chain as well as
for M.
4.4 In￿nitely repeated investment-production game in mixed
strategies
The common knowledge on the distribution of the investment cost A creates
the background for the game in mixed strategies.
Imagine the following: there is no possibility or willingness of vertical
integration, M cannot or does not want to commit to a sharing device and
there is no V ￿￿ such that a ￿rst-best solution in pure strategies may be
implemented. M can stick to a pure strategy ordering Q￿ in every second
period of a generation, realizing the payo⁄ of non-cooperation. However, M
could also try to extract some more rent by ￿ mixing￿her order quantities,
Q￿￿ for the price v2 = (c ￿ c0) with a positive probability ￿ in the second
period and Q￿, v2 = c with (1 ￿ ￿). In case that S invested in the previous
period S would be indi⁄erent between producing or not producing in the
second period since investment is sunk at that time. Thus M would be able
17Parameters
p 500 Q￿ 450 Ahigh 60,000
c 480 Q￿￿ 570 Alow 20,000




Table 5: Parameters for Illustration
to extract some additional rent. In the other case S would simply reject the
second period contract, refusing production. Hence M￿ s payo⁄ would only
reach half of the non-cooperation payo⁄. In equilibrium M chooses ￿ such
as being indi⁄erent between the two pure strategies - playing M2(Q￿￿;c￿c0)
and M2(Q￿;c) in the second period. Therefore M￿ s horizon payo⁄ reaches
the level of non-cooperation [N].
5 Numerical illustration
In this section joint investment is illustrated numerically for chosen para-
meters in Table 5.
The (third-party) veri￿able investment cost function A(￿) = [
p
(1 + ￿)]A
ful￿lls the three required characteristics with a maximal distortion A(1) =
1:41A.
For calculations we distinguish between the current or contracting gener-
ation - where A takes the value of 30,000 - and future generations for which
expected values have been used. This distinction is necessary to investigate
the utility resulting from a hold-up since hold-up can only occur once and
on a current realization of A.
For this setting the numeric values for horizon utilities, U[SC], UM(N),
US(:) and UM(J￿￿), limits for investment decision depending on quantities
produced, e A￿ and e A￿￿, the multiplicators of future values, ￿ and  , and the
minimum sharing parameter favouring joint investment ￿￿ are summarized
in table 6.
These results show that there is a 8:2% supply chain e¢ ciency loss
through the sharing mechanism since 202;704 = U[SC] > UM(J￿￿)+US(:) =
186;011.
We note that S is guaranteed an information rent of US(:) = 5;104. The
investment rationing for "sel￿sh" investments internalized by S is important,
50:7%:
18Results
e A￿￿ 34200   8.3 U[SC] 202,704
e A￿ 27000 ￿￿ 0.3 UM(N) 168,000
US(:) 5,104 UM(J￿￿) 180,907 UM(J1) 172,670
Table 6: Resulting values
The supply chain pro￿t of the centralized solution is independent of ￿
and constant, as is the full investment integration UM(J1).
The existence of an internal solution for the sharing parameter, ￿￿, is
demonstrated in Figure 1. The function UprodHold(eta;A) illustrates M￿ s
payo⁄ from playing [H;J1] and UprodJoint(eta;A) from playing [J￿￿;J￿￿].
UprodJoint(eta;A) is a decreasing function of ￿ since an increasing ￿ rises
investment costs and reduces the probability of investment being undertaken
jointly. For 0 ￿ ￿ < 0:3, M has a strong incentive to play [H;J1] since
UprodHold(eta;A) > UprodJoint(eta;A). For 0:3 < ￿, UprodJoint(eta;A)
dominates.
For ￿ < 0:3, S would anticipate [H;J1] by deviating to [J1;J1]. Since
M￿ s utility from [J￿￿;J￿￿] is higher than from [J1;J1] and S no reason to
reject [J￿￿;J￿￿], this particular game has a Nash equilibrium at ￿￿ = 0:3.
For 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:2 UprodHold(eta;A) is higher than U[SC], represented by
the graph Uintegrated(A), since M is "living at S￿ s expenses": M extracts
more rent from the chain than the chain creates, leaving S below reservation
utility.
The discontinuity in ￿gure 1 stems from loss of a ￿rst-period result above
non-cooperation payo⁄ beyond this threshold.
￿
6 Conclusions
Decentralized supply chains operating in a volatile business climate under
the conditions of short product life cycles, con￿ icting objectives and asym-
metric information often su⁄er from insu¢ cient production capacity provi-
sion. The relevance of the capacity problem has especially been reported for
the telecommunications industry (Agrell et al., 2004) and for Ericsson￿ s sup-
ply chain (The Economist, 2004). Professional experience in both strategic
and operational procurement in the sector of plant engineering and con-
struction from one of the authors con￿rms the importance of appropriate
capacity provision.





UprodHoldeta A , ( )
Upr odJoint eta A , ( )
UintergratedA ()
1 0 eta
Figure 1: Internal solution for investment sharing parameter ￿:
Therefore, the ￿ndings of this work are primarily relevant to the ex ante
capacity incentive problem. We provide some evidence that information dis-
closure and joint investment form a stable equilibrium of the in￿nitely re-
peated game in decentralized supply chains under the previously mentioned
conditions. This means that direct investment commitments can mitigate
the problem of insu¢ cient capacity. The equilibrium supply chain surplus
and the utilities of downstream and upstream participants directly involved
in investment are presented.
One of the revealed prerequisites to the implementation of the invest-
ment equilibrium lies in the protection of both participants form mutual
moral hazard ￿hit-and-run and hold up ￿which has its roots in asymmet-
ric information about investment costs and activity. These agency costs
render the investment more expensive. The other key to promote invest-
ment is to reward cooperation and information sharing by matching the
pro￿t levels potentially obtained upstream through secret undisclosed in-
ternalized investments. The incentive payment necessary to coordinate the
chain corresponds to a pure rent transfer, having no impact on the overall
chain performance. Another interesting ￿nding is the existance of internal
solutions for the investment sharing ￿ ; providing some intuition for the
previously quoted MCC smart investment promotion scheme.
Nevertheless, investment sharing in our setting is still a second-best solu-
tion due to the limitations in contracting length and the cost of veri￿ability.
20Indeed, contrary more stylized situations, repetition alone may not prevent
moral hazard by chain members, either manufacturer￿ s hold-up or supplier￿ s
hit and run and that decreasing margins or rent extraction favour the sharing
mechanism.
However, the equilibrium may be sensitive to parameter changes. These
changes may be favorable, in which case joint investment is not put at risk
and an adjustment of the contract variables, e.g. of the sharing parameter,
increase the performance of the chain and the coordinator￿ s utility. The
opposite direction, disadvantageous parameter changes may require an ad-
justment of the contract variables in order to safe joint investment lowering
the overall performance or may render it impossible. In particular, the
shape and parameters for the cost function for veri￿able investment cost
A(￿) in￿ uence the solutions obtained.
The validity of the dynamic model with repeated interactions is con-
strained by its assumptions. Only the downstream participant is assumed
to shoulder the coordinator-con￿gurator role in the chain. However, a shift
of the coordination role to the supplier could provide interesting insights
about the advantage or disadvantage of such a con￿guration and may even
change the equilibrium.
The outcome of the two-period investment-production game in the Agrell,
Lindroth, Norrman (2004) model is that investment is not an equilibrium in
the absence of complete contracts. Known results for repeated interactions
are more optimistic, showing that supply chain cooperation in uncertain
markets is possible. In contrast, our work shows that even in repeated rela-
tionships, poorly designed contracts and information structures may lower
the overall surplus, but sharing the burden, even partially may bring fea-
sible solutions in settings where business and technological risks exclude
long-term contracting.
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